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Featured graphic: Local taxation and spending as a share of GDP in large 
Western European countries 
 
According to the OECD, local authorities in four of the five largest Western European 
countries now levy taxes that exceed 3% of their country’s GDP. Municipalities in each 
country use these taxes to fund around half of their spending: the balance is largely made up 
of central grants, many of which are earmarked for spending on services such as schools or 
the police. This has been the case in France, Spain and post-unification Germany since data 
became available for each country, and has also characterised the situation in Italy since 
Italian local authorities were granted greater fiscal powers in the late 1990s. As such, local 
government in each of these countries enjoys a reasonable degree of decision-making 
autonomy from the centre in terms of fiscal and spending policies. 
 
By comparison, the United Kingdom is a clear outlier: local taxation revenue equalled only 
1.7% of the UK’s GDP in 2012 (the latest year for which data are available), whereas over 
13% of GDP was spent on local services. Despite changes in party-political control at the 
national level this gap has remained largely stable for over two decades, as the UK 
Government has continued to exert significant influence over local taxation and public 
spending. 
 
However, it was not ever thus. Upon the introduction of the flat-rate domestic Community 
Charge (Poll Tax) in 1991, ministers increased the size of central grants significantly in an 
attempt to soften its impact on citizens. The accompanying legislation also removed local 
government’s power to determine business rates: central government ministers now set a 
single level that applies nationally. These reforms resulted in a sharp drop in revenue from 
local taxes, from which municipalities have never recovered – even though their levels of 
spending have remained fairly stable as a percentage of GDP. The Poll Tax was hugely 
unpopular (and in 1993 it was replaced with a Council Tax based on the value of domestic 
property) but its legacy remains. Indeed, it gave local government finance a toxic political 
profile nationally, which lingers more than two decades later. Fearful of the public’s reaction, 
the government has never authorised a revaluation of property in England (with the result that 
residents still receive bills based on the value of their home in 1991) and also “capped” 
numerous councils that proposed raising it by what ministers believed was an “excessive” 
amount. Although a 2011 reform removed capping, large increases now need to be authorised 
in a local referendum – an outcome so unlikely to happen that it represents a cap in all but 
name. As a result, the income that municipalities can generate from Council Tax – the only 
significant source of revenue over which they have any control – is also largely determined 
by government ministers. The result is a severe example of vertical fiscal imbalance (McLean 
2005) that has major implications for local democracy and economic development.  
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Figure 1: Revenue from taxes levied by local government as a percentage of GDP (Source: 
OECD)1 
 
                                                          
1 Spending data for Italy, Germany and Spain are only available from 1990, 1991 and 1995 
respectively.  
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